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ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes the effects of both anticipated and unanticipated
monetary and fiscal disturbances, on the dynamic behavior of a monetary
model of a small open economy. It focuses on the adjustment of the short—
term andlong—terminterest rates andthedivergence of their transitional
paths, particularly in anticipation of these disturbances. The analysis
demonstrates how anticipation of a future policy change can generate
perverse short—run behavior. The essential reason for the divergence
between the short and long rates is that the latter is dominated by long—
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Most economists would subscribe to the view that portfolio
decisions are generally more flexible than real expenditure decisions.
Consequently, it seems reasonable to assume that the former are based
on short—term rates of interest, while the latter are more likely to
depend upon long—term rates. Nevertheless, most existing macroeconomic
models treat assets as being of common maturity in these two sets of
decisions. Typically, this is assumed to be either extremely short (a
short—term bill) or infinitely long (a perpetuity). Recently, several
authors have recognized the fact that different agents in the economy
are concerned with rates of return over different time horizons. Using
standard domestic macro models they have shown how arbitrage between
the long—term and short—term rates in efficient financial markets
provides important linkages between the present and the future. The
forward—looking information contained in the long rates turns out to
have important implications for the effects of monetary and fiscal
policy; see Blanchard (1981, 1983), Turnovsky and Miller (1984).
In this paper, we introduce the distinction between short—term
and long—term interest rates in a standard monetary model of an open
economy. Much of the current literature in thisarea ehasizes the
informational content of the exchange rate.It is clear that a similar
informational role is played by the long—term interest rate. The paper
analyzes the effects of a variety of disturbances, both unanticipated
and anticipated, and discusses the time paths followed by the short—
term and long—term interest rates in response to these disturbances.—2—
In particular, the divergence in the adjustment between the short—term
and long—term rates in anticipation of such disturbances, is highlighted.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the model,
(which for the most part is familiar), together with its solution, is
outlined. Sections 3, 4 analyze two alternative disturbances, namely:
(i) domestic monetary expansion; (ii) domestic fiscal expansion. The
conclusions are summarized in Section 5, while an Appendix contains
some of the technical details of the analysis.
2. THE MODEL
The model we employ is a variant of the standard Dornbusch
(1976) model, embodying perfect foresight, see Gray and Turnovsky (1979).











Py(Z-Y) y >0 (if)
where
Zreal aggregate demand for domestic output,
Y =supplyof domestic output, assumed to be fixed
at full employment,—3—
G =realdomestic government expenditure,
R =domesticlong—term real rate of interest,
r =domesticshort—term real rate of interest,
i =domesticshort—term nominal interest rate,
=foreignnominal (and real) interest rate,
taken to be fixed,
E =exchangerate (expressed in terms of units of
foreign currency per unit of domestic currency),
expressed in logarithms,
P =domesticprice level, expressed in logarithms,
M =domesticnominal money supply, expressed in
logarithms.
Equation (la) specifies the aggregate demand for domestic
output to be a negative function of the domestic long—term real interest
rate and a positive function of the relative price (E—P) where we
assume that the foreign price level remains fixed at unity. It also
depends positively upon the fixed level of output and upon real govern--
ment expenditure.
The introduction of the long—term real interest rate R into
the real expenditure function Z is a key part of the model. While this
specification has by now been adopted by several authors, it nevertheless
merits further comment; see also Blanchard (1981, 1984), Miller and
Turnovsky (1984), Sachs and Wyplosz (1984). Several justifications
for this can be given. First, to the extent that Z includes expenditures
on investment goods, it depends upon "Tobin's q,' which in turn is
inversely related to the long—term real interest rate. Secondly, it
reflects asset values, and their impact through the wealth effect on—4—
current consumption; see Blanchard (1981). Finally, Buiter and Miller
(1983) suggest that for Britain, most government debt is held by
institutional investors, such as pension funds, having long term
horizon so that some notion of permanent real interest income, based
on a long—term rate, provides a better approximation of the actual flow
of disposable interest income to the ultimate wealth owning and spend-
ing units. This leads them to argue for the plausibility of the long—
term rate as a determinant of private expenditure. It is also possible
for consumption to depend upon the short—term real rate of interest r,
as well. The inclusion of this variable, in addition to R, does not
alter the substance of our analysis in any essential way.
Domestic money market equilibrium is specified by (ib), with
the demand for money depending upon the short—term nominal interest rate.
Note that we follow Dornbusch and do not introduce the distinction between
the price of domestic output and overall domestic cost of living. To
introduce this distinction adds little insight and merely complicates
the analysis.-' Domestic and foreign bonds are assumed to be perfect
substitutes on an uncovered basis, so that the uncovered interest parity
condition (ic) applies, while the short-term real rate of interest is
defined in (id).
The long—term real rate of interest is defined to be the yield
on a consol paying a constant (real) coupon flow of unity. If we denote
such a yield by R, the price of the consol is hR. The instantaneous
rate of return on consols is therefore
R +d(l/R)/dt=R-R/R—5—
We assume that the long—term bonds and the short—terra bonds are per-
fect substitutes, so that their instantaneous real rates of return
are equal, as in (le).-' Integrating this equation, we obtain
R(t) = 1 — (le')
et r(t')dt'
t
This relationship shows explicitly how the current long—terra rate
embodies information about the future (expected) short rates.-1
Finally, equation (if) describes the rate of price adjustment in
terms of a simple Phillips curve relationship.
The steady state of the economy is attained when R =P=E=0
and is described by
(i-1)Y = +3(E-P) + G (2a)
M—Pct1Y-ct2R (2b)
R=r= ii* (2c)
where tildes denote steady—state values. In equilibrium, the product
market clears and the short—term and long—term real and nominal rates
are all equal to the exogenously given world interest rate i*. The
following long—run equilibrium effects are immediately deduced




An expansion in the domestic nominal money supply leads tolong-run
proportional changes in the exchange rate and domesticprice level,
leaving the long—run interest rates unchanged. An expansion in domestic
government expenditure leaves the domestic price level and interest rate(s)
unchanged. The exchange rate must appreciate, thereby lowering private
demand, and accommodating the increased government expenditure, given
the fixed output.
Linearizing the system about the stationary equilibrium and
substituting, the dynamics can be reduced to the following matrix equa-
tion in R, E, andP
r Ri3-R[l/a2 +
L J
= l/c2 E-E (4)
P _L—
Itcan be shown that the three eigenvalues A, A2, A3, of this system
have the following properties
y83
A1A2A3 =— — R<0
63 63 + + A3A1 = —y[R63+ —+R —]< 0
Itthen follows from these two relationships that there must be one
negativeand two positive roots, say A1 <0,A2 >0,A3 >0.The system
thereforepossesses saddlepoint behavior. We assume that while the price
0—7—
levelP always evolves continuously, in accordance with the Phillips
curve, both the exchange rate and the long—term real rate can jump
discontinuously in response to unanticipated disturbances. They are
therefore "news" variables.
In Sections 3,4 below, we consider once—and—for—all unit
increases in the following quantities
(i) domestic nominal money supply,
(ii) domestic government expenditure.
These changes are assumed to be announced at time 0 for time T >0,
with the limiting case T =0describing an unanticipated shock.
In the Appendix, we derive the general solution to (4) on the
assumption that the economy begins in an initial steady state. Given
the assumptions we have made about the nature of the dynamic variables,
these solutions are unique. They form the basis for our subsequent
descriptions of the response of the economy to the various disturbances.
Because the dynamics is third order, we are unable to give a simple
two—dimensional illustration of the phase diagram in the three state
variables R, P, and E. However, we do see from the solutions (A.3a')—
(A.3c') that when t>T,that is after the announced disturbance has
occurred, that R, E, and P follow the pairs of linear relationships,







where X <0and h. are the elements of the matrix of coefficients
1 ij
appearing in (4). It is seen that h13 <0,h2 >0,h23 >0,while
adding the restriction 1 >y32,ensures h11 >0.Equation (5a) is
indeed the locus of the stable arm of the saddlepoint in terms of the
exchange rate and the domestic price level, familiar from the Dornbusch
model, and is negatively sloped. Equation (5b) is an analogous rela-
tionship between the long—term real rate and the domestic price level.
Under the conditions stated above, it is positively sloped.
3. DOMESTIC MONETARY EXPANSION
Insofar as possible, our treatment shall be graphical. Formal
solutions for the time paths for this (and other) disturbances can be
obtained from the general solution given in the Appendix. Following the
monetary expansion, the economy follows a stable first order locus (the
stable arm of the saddlepoint) and is easily illustrated. In the case
of an announced increase, however, during the period after the announce-
ment, but prior to the change, the economy follows an unstable third
order locus. In this case it is difficult to illustrate the time paths
precisely and the paths we have illustrated in a few instances are based
on a consideration of plausible limiting cases.-'
Figure 1 describes the adjustment of the exchange rate, the
long—term real rate, and the price level, in phase space. Figure 2
illustrates the paths for the short—term real and nominal, and long—
term real, interest rates over time. For ease of comparison, the short—
term real rate r appears in both graphs in Figures 2A, 2B. Unanticipated and
anticipated monetary expansions are considered in turn, and illustrated
separately in Figure 2.—9—
As shown in Section 2, a permanent unit increase in M increases
the exchange rate and the price level proportionately, while leaving the
long—term rate R unchanged. Accordingly, if 0 depicts the original
steady state in both Figures 1A, 1B, the new equilibria are at N and W,
respectively. Thus the monetary expansion causes the stable locuses,
corresponding to (5a) and (5b), and illustrated by XX', YY', to move to
X1Xj, Y1Y, respectively.
A. Unanticipated Domestic Monetary Expansici
An unanticipated increase in th domestic money supply causes
the exchange rate to jump instantaneously from 0 to L on X1X. There-
after, the exchange rate begins to appreciate gradually, while the price
level begins to increase, taking the system towards N. This figure
illustrates the well known 'overshooting' of the exchange rate in the
Dornbusch model.-' At the same time, the monetary expansion causes the
long—term real rate to fall instantaneously from 0 to U. It then begins
to climb gradually back towards its original level, as the price level
begins to increase.
The time paths for the interest rates i, r, and R are illustrated
in Figure 2A. The fact that following the initial depreciation, the
exchange rate begins to immediately appreciate at A (E <0),means that
i(0) K
sothat the domestic short—term nominal interest rate is immediately
driven below the world rate. With the price level rising and the nominal
money stock now fixed at its new (higher) level, the real money stock
begins to fall and the domestic short—term nominal rate rises back up—10--
begins to fall and the domestic short—term nominal rate rises back up
towards the equilibrium world rate.
A further consequence of the steadily rising price subsequent
to the monetary expansion (P >0)is that
r<i
so that the short—term real rate lies below the short—term nominal rate.
At the sametime, sincethe short—term rate is rising over time, and
since the long—terni real rate R is discounting the expected future time
path of r, it follows that the current long—term real rate must always
exceed the current short—term real rate. Another way of seeing this
is from the arbitrage relationship (le), which we may write as
(le')
Since the long—term real rate rises continuously, following the initial
drop, for the short—term and long—term rates of return to be equal,
R >r,as illustrated.
B. Anticipated Monetary Expansion
Suppose that at time 0 the domestic monetary authorities
announce an expansion in the money supply to take effect at time T say.
The announcement of this event causes the exchange rate to depreciate
to L', while the long—term real rate of interest falls to U'. The
combination of the fall in the long—term real rate coupled with the
devaluation of the exchange rate, leads to an increase in real demand
Z, causing the domestic price level to begin rising.—11—
Given that the money supply remains fixed prior to time T
and that the price level is constrained to move continuously, the real
money stock remains fixed at the time of announcement, t=0.Hence,
the short—term nominal interest rate i also remains fixed at time 0.
The interest rate parity condition (lc) therefore implies that follow—
ing the initial jump in the exchange rate, the rate of exchange deprecia-
tion is immediately zero =0).As the price level begins to rise,
however, in anticipation of the monetary expansion, the domestic real
money stock begins to fall and the exchange rate starts to increase
again to equilibrate the money market; in E—P space, the economy moves
along the locus L'M' in Figure 1A. At time T, when the anticipated
monetary expansion takes place, E and P begin to move along the stable
locus XXj.
The behavior of the long—term real rate is given in Figure lB
and is more difficult to establish. The arbitrage condition indicates
that the behavior of R depends upon the difference between the
short—term and long—term real rates of interest. On the one hand, the
announcement of the monetary expansion causes the long—term real rate
to fall. At the same time, the short—term real rate also falls, by
virtueof the short—run rise in the rate of inflation and the fact that
the nominal interest rate remains fixed. A linear approximation to the
difference R —r,and therefore to the initial rate of change R, expressed
in terms of the initial discrete change in R and E is given by
dR(O) =R(l- +Ry3dE(O) (6)—12—
In principle, it appears that either the long—term real rate effect, or
the short—term real rate effect (which operates via the inflation rate)
may dominate, in which case R(O) may either begin to rise or fall
(I(O) 0). Much depends upon the flexibility of the domestic price
level, as described by y. However, if we assume that the price level
moves sufficiently slowly for the fall in the long—term real rate to
dominate, then R will continue to fall following its initial fall.
Thus the real rate follows a time path such as illustrated by U'V' in
Figure lB. Following the monetary expansion at time T, the long—term
real rate begins to rise, along with the price level, as R and P move
along the locus Y1Y.
Weturn now to the time paths of interest rates, illustrated
in Figure 2B, As noted, at the time of announcement, the real money
supply remains fixed, so that for money market equilibrium to prevail,
the demand for money, and hence the short—term nominal interest rate,
remains fixed instantaneously. As the price level rises during the
period prior to the monetary expansion (the interval 0, T), the real
money stock falls and the short—term nominal interest rate rises along
AA. At the time of the monetary expansion, the real money stock M —P
rises, so that the short—term nominal interest rate falls. Thereafter,
with the nominal money supply fixed at the new level and the price level
continuing to rise, the real money stock falls continuously and the short—
term nominal interest rate must again be rising, the short—term nominal
rate must fall to a point such as B, which lies below the equilibrium
level, i*, which it then approaches along the path BB'.—1 3—
The initial positive inflation rate, generated by the announce-
ment, means that on impact the short—term real rate of interest falls,
as already noted. With prices rising throughout the adjustment, this
also means that the short—term real rate is always less than the short—
term nominal rate; see Figure 2B. The adjustment of the short—term
rate during the period (0, T) depends upon whether the exchange rate
increases faster than the price level. We have drawn the time path on
the assumption that this is the case, so that r rises along with the
nominal rate i. However, we cannot rule out the contrary behavior.
At the time of the monetary expansion (time T), the inflation
rate moves continuously. This is seen from equation (la) and (if),
where with E, P, R constrained to adjustment continuously everywhere
(other than for possible jumps in the latter two at the announcement
date), the same must apply to the rate of inflation P. It then follows
that the fall in the short—term real rate at time T must equal that of
the short—term nominal rate at that time; i.e., the distances A'B, C'D
in Figure 2B must be equal.
In the second part of Figure 2B we have plotted the short—term
and long—term real rates. We have commented how at time 0, the long—
term rate drops by an amount which is likely to exceed the fall in the
short—term real rate. This means that for the arbitrage condition to
hold, the long—term real rate must continue to fall (at least initially)
If the short—term real rate r, beging driven primarily by the rise in
the short—term nominal rate, begins to rise, then the long—term rate
will lie below it and will continue to fall, in order to generate the
capital gains to ensure the equality between the real rates of return
on the short—term and long—term securities.—14—
Thelong—term real rate fails along FF' and therefore is less
than the short—term real rate, until F', when the monetary expansion
takes place. At that time, the stable locus is reached and R begins to
rise. At the same instance, the downward jump in the short—term rate
occurs, so that DD' lies below F'G as R and r approach their common
equilibrium level i'.
Looking at Figures 2B together, we see that the various interest
rates being considered exhibit diverse behavior during the various phases
of the adjustment. The short—run monetary contraction generated by the
rising price level, which inmiediately follows the announcement, causes
the nominal interest rate to begin rising in the short run. The short—
term real rate will initially fall, but will likely then begin rising
and follow the nominal rate. The long—term real rate, on the other hand,
also falls initially, but in contrast to the short—term real rate, will
likely continue falling, as it discounts the expected future downward
jump in the short—term real rate which will take place at time T. Prior
to the monetary expansion at time T, the long—term real rate lies below
the short—term real rate; after the policy change is introduced, this
relationship is reversed.
4. DOMESTIC FISCAL EXPANSION
A permanent unit increase in domestic government expenditure
leads to a long—run appreciation of the exchange rate, while leaving the
steady—state domestic price level and real rate of interest unchanged.
This means that the stable locus in E—P space shifts down from XX' to
X1Xj, while YY' remains fixed in R—P space.—15—
A. Unanticipated Increase in Government Expenditure
The effect of an unanticipated fiscal expansion on the economy
is very simple. All it does is to cause the exchange rate to appreciate
instantaneously to its new steady state level at N in Figure 3A, with
the domestic price level and real (and nominal) interest rates remaining
unchanged. The transitional dynamics generates.
B. Anticipated Increase in Government Expenditure
The response of the economy to an announced fiscal expansion
is very different. At the time of the announcement, the exchange rate
immediately appreciates to L in Figure 3A. The immediate response in
the long—term real rate, R(O), however, is not clear. It is shown in
the Appendix that in the short run, the long—term real rate of interest
will rise if the interest elasticity of the demand for money, flSay,
evaluated at the long—run equilibrium is greater than unity (in magnitude);
it will fall otherwise.
An intuitive explanation for this behavior runs as follows.
A large value of the equilibrium rate of interest R, and hence for a
given value of c2, a large value of the interest elasticity of the demand
for money, r, will tend to generate a low level of real private expenditure.
This in turn generates a high rate of deflation, thereby leading to a
high level of the short—term real rate. Now the long—term real interest
rate at any moment of time is a discounted average of all the expected
future short—term real rates. As we shall see below, following an announced
fiscal expansion, the short—term real rate initially rises above its
steady—state equilibrium and subsequently falls below this level. Thus—16--
if the elasticity n is large and r is relatively large, the positive
movements in r, which oLcur during the initial phases of the adjust-
ment, will dominate and initially, the long—term real rate will rise.
On the other hand, if r is small so thatr is relatively low, the nega-
tive movements in r, which occur during the latter phases of the adjust-
ment, will cominate and the initial long—term real rate will fall.
Consider the case where the interest elasticity of the demand
for money is greater than unity. The initial rise in the long—term real
rate, together with the appreciation of the exchange rate means that at
the time of the announcement, demand for domestic output falls, causing
the domestic price level to begin falling. In the other case where the
elasticity exceeds unity, the fall in the long—term real rate offsets
the effect of exchange rate on demand, and in general we are unable to
determine which influence dominates. However, if T is taken to be
sufficiently small, the exchange rate effect dominates and the domestic
price level begins to fall as illustrated in Figure 3B.
With the real money stock fixed instantaneously, the short—
term nominal interest rate remains fixed, so that following its initial
jump, the rate of exchange depreciation is zero initially. As the price
level begins to fall, the real money stock begins to rise and the short—
term nominal interest rate falls in order to equilibrate the money mar—
ket. The appreciation of the exchange rate, together with the falling
domestic price level means that E and P move in the direction of LM in
Figure 3A. At time T, when the anticipated fiscal expansion occurs,
the increase in the demand for output so generated causes the domestic-17-
price level to begin rising. The exchange rate, however, will continue
to fall as long as the price level has not been restored to its initial
equilibrium level. This is necessary because until this occurs, there
will be an increase in the real money stock and for money market equilibrium
to be maintained there must be an appreciating exchange rate.
The behavior of the long—term real rate is illustrated in Figure
3B. If the interest elasticity n > 1, so that R rises initially, then R
may either begin to continue rising, or it may immediately begin to
start falling; i.e., R(O)O.k' We have drawn it falling and initially
following the path U'V'. This seems the most plausible case since we
know that eventually R must return to its initial level. On the other
hand, if the interest elasticity n < 1 and R initially falls, then it
will definitely initially continue to fall following the initial jump;
ie,, R(O) < 0. A path such as U"V" will be followed. During the trans-
ition, following the announcement but prior to the fiscal expansion,
the long—term real rate will have fallen below its equilibrium. At
time T, when the expansion occurs, the knowledge that the short—term
real rate of interest is below its equilibrium and will therefore rise
in the future, causes the long—term real rate to begin rising at time
We now consider the time paths of the interest rates, depicted
in Figure 4. The short—term nominal rate remains fixed at the time of
announcement. With the price level falling during the perior prior to
the expansion (0, T), the real money stock rises and the short—term
nominal interest rate falls along the path AA'. At the time of the
fiscal expansion, the real domestic money stock remains unchanged, SO
that the path for the nominal interest is continuous at that point.-18—
However, with the price level now beginning to rise, the real money
stock now begins to fall and the nominal interest rate begins to rise
back up towards the equilibrium world rate.
The initial deflation at time 0, generated by the announce-
ment, means that the short—term real rate immediately rises above the
short—term nominal rate. With prices falling throughout the entire
period (0, T), this means that r always lies above i during that phase.
Whether the short—term rate is actually rising or falling depends upon
whether the exchange rate falls faster than the price level. We have
drawn the time path on the assumption that this is the case, so that r
falls with i. At the time of the fiscal expansion the price level
begins to rise. The short—term real rate therefore immediately falls
below the short—term nominal rate. It remains there during its subse-
quent adjustment to equilibrium as prices continue to rise during this
phase.
The short—term and long—term real rates are drawn in Figures
4B and 4C for the two cases where the latter rises in the short run and
falls in the short run, respectively. Consider Figure 4B first. With
R falling during period (0, T), after its initial increase, it follows
from the arbitrage condition (le) that the short—term real rate must
exceed the long—term real rate. When R begins to increase following
the fiscal expansion, the short—term real rate drops below it and
remains below during the subsequent transition.
Figure 4C illustrates the case where R initially falls. While
we have seen that in the short run R will continue to fall, it is reason-
able to suppose that the declining price level, together with the falling19—
R, will tend to reduce the rate of deflation, As a consequence, the
divergence between the short—term and long—term real rates is eliminated
and this causes R to begin rising as it approaches the locus YYV. In
that case, the time paths for the short—term and long—term real rates
will intersect at the point where R reaches its minimum level.
As in the case of an anticipated monetary expansion, Figure 4
illustrates the divergent behavior of the various rates of interest,
in response to an anticipated fiscal expansion, particularly during the
initial phase. The short—term nominal rate follows the smoothest path,
gradually declining initially before eventually increasing back to its
equilibrium level. The short—term real rate undergoes two jumps; an
upward jump at the announcement date, a downward jump when the expan-
sion actually occurs. During the early phase it declines gradually,
while following the downward jump at time T, it gradually increases
towards its equilibrium level. The long—term rate undergoes only jump,
namely at the initial time of announcement. Thereafter, it will tend
to decline before subsequently increasing back up to its equilibrium
level. Like i it may also always lie below the equilibrium world rate,
but this need not be the case.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of monetary and
fiscal disturbances, both unanticipated and anticipated, on the dynamic
behavior of a monetary model of a small open economy. Attention has
focused on the adjustment of the short—term and long—term interest
rates and the divergence of their transitional time paths, particularly—20—
in anticipation of these disturbances. We haveshown how the anticipa-
tion of a future policy change cangenerate perverse short—run behavior.
Thus, for example, the announcement of a future fiscalexpansion may
cause the long—term rate to rise initially. In thiscase, initial
contractionary effects in the economy are generated, though theseare
eventually reversed when the fiscal expansion occurs. It isalso possible
for the initial responses of the short—term andlong—term rates to be
in opposite directions, thereby twisting theyield curve in the short
run. The essential reason for the difference in behaviorof the short
and long rates is the fact that the long rate isdominated by anticipated
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-'The distinction between short—term andlong—term interest rates in
the context of an open economy is briefly considered by Sachs and
Wyplosz (1984) in their simulation model.
'Most importantly, this would introducethe distinction between
alternative measures of real interest rates.
-'This relationship is basedon the assumption of risk neutrality.
To take account adequately of risk averse agents would require a
full stochastic model, going beyond the scope of this paper.
-'Equation (le') assumes that the future short—termrates are known
exactly.If this is not the case, r(t') would be replaced by
r*(t',t), the prediction of the future short—term rate for time
t' formed at time t. One can define an analogous relationship
between the short—term and long—term nominal rates. However,
since the latter does not play any role in the model, this is
not required.
-WIn an expanded version of thispaper, we also analyze the effects
of a once—and—for—all unit increase in the foreign interest rate.
'For example, thelimiting cases (purchasingpower parity)
and 830, (zero substitutability between domestic and foreign
goods in demand) provide some insight into the behavior of the
economy in these special cases.
-From equation (5a),we see
dE(O)=1— > 1
This is identical to the expression obtained by Gray and Turnovsky
(1979) for the amount of exchange rate overshooting in the Dornbusch
model.
'The behavior of R(O)can be seen from equation (6) and noting that
while R(O) may either rise or fall, E(O) definitely falls.
21in considering thepartial phase diagrams illustrated in Figure 3,
it is interesting to note that if the fiscal expansion is unannounced,
the adjustment is instantaneous. On the other hand, the adjustment
to an anticipated disturbance takes an infinite time, even if the
lead time T is small but strictly positive. In this case, the adjust-
ments in R and P would be small, while E would jump close to its new
equilibrium level. But in a strict formal sense, it would still take
an infinite time to reach the new equilibrium.APPENDIX
1.General Solution to Model






wherethe h.. are identified by the corresponding elements in the
matrix in (4). We assume that at time 0 the system is in steady state
with R = E=
E1,
P =
P1.At time 0 a change is anticipated to take
effect at time T. The new steady state is given by R2, E2, P2.
The solution to (A.l) is as follows:
0 <t<T:
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where A1 <0,A2 >0,A3 >0are the eigenvalues. There are six arbi-
trary constants to be determined: C1, C, i =1,2, 3. They are
determined as follows:
(i) In order for the system to remain bounded as t-
werequire
C C 0 (A.4a)
(ii) We assume that P evolves continuously from its initial
given condition, so that
C1+C2+C3=0 (A.4b)
(iii) The time paths for R, E, and P are assumed to be continuous
for t>0.In particular, at t=T,the solutions for (A.2) and (A.3)
must coincide. Thus
AT A2T A1
(C1_C)e+ Ce + C3e p2 —p1 (A.4c)





















Thus the general solution for the system is as follows:-A3-
































where C1, C2, C3, C are determined by (A.4a)—(A.4d). The values of
these constants depend upon the change in the steady state. This in
turn depends upon the particular disturbance to the system and in
each case can be obtained from equations (3) of the text.
2. Determination of Sgn R(0) Following Announcement of Fiscal Expansion
To begin, note that A, A, A3, being eigenvalues, satisfy




-[3+32+R2/2]A+ 3R/n2 =0 (A.5)
Using the standard properties of roots of polynomials, we have
X1A2X3 =—'y'3R/n (A.6a)-A4-
A1A2 + A2A3 + A3A1 = + + (A.6b)
A1 + A2 + A3 =R(1-y2)
—
Y3 (A.6c)
These relationships can be easily expressed in terms of the h... We
define the quantity
(A) - +3] + 32 (A.7)




In the case of a fiscal expansion,
= ( say), P2 —= , E2 =
—l/i.33
Solving equations (A.4b)—(A.4e) for C1, C2, C3, C, and substituting
back into (A.2a), we may express the solution as
-(h23h32+ A1A3)(h23h32 + A1A2)-A3T-e2
223311 L 2 3J
—AT—AT
where A1 <0,A2 >0,A3 >0.The term [e —e2
]/(A2—X3) >0and
thus
sgn{R(0) - = sgn{(h23h32+ A1A3)(h23h32 + A1A2)} (A.l0)
Multiplying out the expression on the right hand side of (A.10) and
using (A.6a)—(A6c), we find
3
(h23h32 + X1A3)(h23h32 + X1X2) =—h—A5 —
where
Thus
sgn[R(O) —Ri sgn (A.il)







Since the money supply is measured in logarithms —a2 is the semi—elasticity
of demand, so that —a2R measures the interest elasticity of demand,
evaluated at steady state equilibrium. Letting 'a2R,and combining
(A.ll) and (A.12) we obtain
sgn[R(O) —Ri=sgn(—l) (A.14)REFERENCES
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